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Abstract
We modify the price-setting version of the vertically di¤erentiated
duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in
which rms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the qual-
ity stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure
strategies, in which rms always select sequential play at the qual-
ity stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, reveal-
ing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is
higher than its complement to one. In the alternative of full market
coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strate-
gies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash
and Stackelberg solutions coincide.
JEL codes: C73, L13
Keywords: endogenous timing, product quality, market coverage.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we study the equilibria of a vertically di¤erentiated Bertrand
duopoly where the timing of moves at the quality stage is endogenised via an
extended game with observable delay à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In
particular, we take this standpoint to complement the analysis carried out
by Aoki (2003), in which
 variable production costs are nil and quality improvements hinge upon
xed costs,
 the quality stage is assumed to be either simultaneous or sequential
and the timing cannot be decided by rms and
 in the sequential case, the leader and followers roles are predetermined
while the choice between high and low quality is endogenous. This
yields that the leader will supply a higher quality than the rivals (see
Aoki, 2003, Proposition 2, p. 659).
Here instead we assume as exogenous the location of rms along the
quality spectrum, while endogenising the distribution of roles to be taken at
the quality stage through a pre-play stage preceding the quality investment
phase. In this respect, our analysis is based on dAspremont and Gérard-
Varet (1980) and Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), according to whom a game
is Stackelberg-solvable if there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium that Pareto-
dominates the Nash solution.1
Our analysis consider two alternative cases separately. In the rst (al-
ready considered by Aoki, 2003), partial market coverage prevails. If so,
1The analysis of the same vertically di¤erentied industry under Cournot competition is
in Lambertini and Tampieri (2012), where it is shown that there exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium where sequential play obtains in the quality stage and the low-quality
rm takes the leaders role.
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then from the analysis of the quality stage, there emerges that both rms
best replies are increasing. This produces two pure-strategy equilibria, both
charcterised by sequential play, posing a coordination problem. Additionally,
there also exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, whose characterisa-
tion reveals that the probability of generating an out-of-equilibrium outcome
(that is, committing the mistake of playing simultaneously) is indeed strigtly
higher than the probability of playing one of the two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. In the second scenario, we investigate the same issue under
full market coverage (not considered by Aoki, 2003). This reveals that the
quality stage has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium at the intersection
of dominant strategies where the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide,
since best reply functions are orthogonal in that stage. This implies that,
in the presence of full market coverage, the choice of timing becomes indeed
immaterial.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly market for vertically di¤erentiated products supplied
by single-product rms. The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen
(1978). There is a continuum of consumers whose types are identied by ,
uniformly distributed with density equal to one in the interval [0; 1]; with
0 = 1 1, where  represents the consumersmarginal willingness to pay for
quality. Each consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the vertically
di¤erentiated good in order to maximise the following surplus function:
U = qi   pi; (1)
where qi 2 [0; Q] indicates the quality of the product and pi is the market
price at which that variety is supplied by rm i = H;L; with qH  qL:
Therefore, the consumer who is indi¤erent between qH and qL is identied
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by the level of marginal willingness to pay b that solves bqH pH = bqL pL;
and therefore b = (pH   pL) = (qH   qL). Hence, market demand for the
high-quality good is xH = 1 b. For the moment, we assume partial market
coverage, so that there exists a consumer indi¤erent between buying qL or
not buying at all, identied by the marginal willingness to pay e solvingeqL   pL = 0; whereby e = pL=qL and the demand for the inferior variety
is xL = b   e. As in Aoki (2003), variable costs are assumed away and
rms incur in convex xed costs of quality improvement Ci = kqni ; i = H;L,
where k > 0 and n  2. Hence prot functions are H = pHxH   kqnH and
L = pLxL   kqnL.
Aoki (2003) analyses a two-stage non cooperative game in which, taking
the timing of moves at the quality stage as given, rms rst (i) set qualities,
and then (ii) set prices, the second stage taking place under simultaneous
play. From this structure, Aoki (2003, Proposition 2, p. 659) draws the
conclusion that, if information at the quality stage is perfect, then the leader
is the high-quality rm.
To o¤er an alternative persepctive, we depart from Aokis setup in propos-
ing a game consisting of three stages, in which rms identities along the
quality ladder are given at the outset. In the rst stage, rms choose the
timing to be followed in the second stage, where qualities are set, and then in
the third stage simultaneous Bertrand competition takes place. The solution
concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
The rst stage is a pre-play stage à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in
which, under complete, symmetric and imperfect information, rms play a
discrete strategy game represented in Matrix 1.
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LF S
H F NH ; 
N
L 
SL
H ; 
SF
L
S SFH ; 
SL
L 
N
H ; 
N
L
Matrix 1
Actions F and S stand for rstor second, and refers to the choice of
roles in the quality stage, while superscripts N , SL, and SF stand for Nash,
Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower, respectively. If rms select the
same strategy - along the main diagonal - then the second-stage quality game
is simultaneous. Conversely, along the secondary diagonal, the quality stage
is going to be solved à la Stackelberg.
3 Results
To begin with, we recollect Aoki (2003)s results to establish how they change
by taking as exogenous the location of rms in the quality spectrum and
endogenising the timing of quality investment. Aoki (2003) shows that, under
Bertrand competition, the best replies at the quality stage are increasing and
discontinuous if both rms are still to choose their relative positions along the
quality spectrum (Aoki, 2003, Lemma 2, p. 657). By the same token, there
are two pure-strategy (and identical) Nash equilibria to the simultaneous
quality choice game (Aoki, 2003, Proposition 1, p. 658) and one Stackelberg
equilibrium in the sequential game where the leader produces the higher
quality (Aoki, 2003, Proposition 2, p. 659). The results are based on the
fact that the high and low quality roles are endogenous, while the timing of
moves is exogenously given.
Conversely, by assuming as exogenous whether a rm provides the high
or low quality, the best response functions become continuous and rms may
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indeed have the possibility of non cooperatively choosing the respective roles
in the quality stage via an extended game with observable delay à laHamilton
and Slutsky (1990).
The results can be qualitatively assessed by examining Figure 1, which
shows the map of best replies and the isoprot curves. The Nash equilibrium
(point N) under simultaneous play yields to both rm L and rm H a lower
prot as compared to either of the Stackelberg equilibria (points SL and SH),
so that the following chains of inequalities hold:
SFH > 
SL
H > 
N
H
SFL > 
SL
L > 
N
L
(2)
Hence, the timing game depicted in Matrix 1 yields two pure-strategy equi-
libria along the secondary diagonal, according to which rm is leader. It is
noteworthy to point out that, in each equilibrium the follower obtains the
highest prot. This is perfectly in line with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
according to which if a rm has a decreasing (resp., increasing) reaction func-
tion, it will prefer to move rst (resp., second) (see Hamilton and Slutsky,
1990, Theorem V, p. 38). The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 1 With Bertrand competition, the three stage game has two
pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria along the secondary diagonal, in which
rms choose to play sequentially at the quality stage.
6
Figure 1. The map of best replies with partial market coverage.
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The multiplicity problem highlighted by the above Proposition also entails
that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which is worth investi-
gating so as to ascertain the relative probabilities of playing one of the two
pure-strategy equilibria along the secondary diagonal of Matrix 1, or instead
committing a mistake by generating either outcome along the main diagonal.
Given the a priori symmetry of the model, we can solve the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of the rst stage of the game from the standpoint of rm
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i = H;L; whose task is to attach probabilities pi 2 [0; 1] to strategy F and
1 pi to strategy S, respectively, so as to make rm j 6= i indi¤erent between
its own pure strategies. This implies solving the following equation:
pi
N
j + (1  pi)SLj = piSFj + (1  pi)Nj (3)
w.r.t. pi, delivering
pi =
SLj   Nj
SFj + 
SL
j   2Nj
2 (0; 1) : (4)
Using (4), we can quickly estabilish that the probability of playing either
(F; S) or (F; S) is
P ((F; S) [ (S; F )) = pH (1  pL) + (1  pH) pL (5)
while the probability of playing along the main diagonal is
P ((F; F ) [ (S; S)) = pHpL + (1  pH) (1  pL) ; (6)
with
P ((F; F ) [ (S; S)) P ((F; S) [ (S; F )) = (7) 
SFH   SLH
  
SFL   SLL

(SFH + 
SL
H   2NH) (SFL + SLL   2NL )
> 0:
This result holds irrespective of the degree of vertical di¤erentiation to be
chosen in the second stage, as long as qH > qL, and implies:
Corollary 2 The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium at the timing stage reveals
that the probability of committing a mistake is strictly higher than the proba-
bility of playing either pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for all admissible pair
of qualities qH > qL:
The problem of multiple equilibria disappears if full market coverage ob-
tains. In what follows, we retain the set of assumptions introduced above,
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except that now the market demand for the low-quality good is xL = b  
(1   1). The prot functions at the third stage are thus dened as
H = pH

1   pH   pL
qH   qL

  kqnH ; L = pL

pH   pL
qH   qL   1 + 1

  kqnL : (8)
From the rst order conditions at the market stage, we obtain the following
equilibrium prices:
pH =
(1 + 1) (qH   qL)
3
; (9)
pL =
(2  1) (qH   qL)
3
; (10)
implying the constraint 1 2 (1; 2) : Full market coverage is admissible if and
only if the individual of the lowest type 0 obtains a non-negative surplus
from the consumption of the low-quality good, i.e., if:
(1   1) qL   pL  0: (11)
Plugging (10) into (11), the latter turns out to be satied by all
qL  (21   1) qL
2  1 (12)
with
(21   1) qL
2  1 > qL (13)
in the admissible range of 1: This yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Given 1 2 (1; 2) ; full market coverage is admissible for all
qH 2

qL;
(21   1) qL
2  1

: (14)
We turn now on the quality stage. The relevant prot functions are:
H =
(1 + 1)
2 (qH   qL)
9
  kqnH ;
L =
(2  1)2 (qH   qL)
9
  kqnL:
(15)
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The rst order conditions for non cooperative prot maximisation are:
@H
@qH
=
(1 + 1)
2
9
  9nkqn 1H = 0; (16)
@L
@qL
=
(2  1)2
9
  9nkqn 1L = 0: (17)
Given that (16-17) do not allow for a fully analytical characterisation of
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we investigate the solution of the quality
stage through the map of the reaction functions, implicitly determined by
the above FOCs. In particular, Bulow et al. (1985) show that the nature
of strategic interaction is completely determined by the sign of the partial
derivatives of FOCs with respect to the competitors quality, which indicate
the slopes of reaction functions qi (qj), i; j = H;L; i 6= j: It is straightforward
to check that:
@qH (qL)
@qL
=
@2H
@qH@qL
= 0; (18)
@qL (qH)
@qH
=
@2L
@qL@qH
= 0; (19)
so that each rm has a dominant strategy to be adopted irrespective of the
competitors quality choice. This also implies that the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium in the second stage coincide. Hence the timing plays no role in
determining the investment in quality both for the H and L rm, and the
rst stage disappears altogether (equivalently, one can say that, under full
coverage, the three-stage game collapses into a two stage game as the choice
of roles becomes immaterial).
Figure 2 shows the map of the best replies and the respective isoprot
curves. Clearly, the point where the reaction functions intersect (i.e., the
Nash solution) corresponds to the point where the isoprot curve of each
rm (playing as the Stackelberg leader) is tangent to the reaction function of
the respective competitor (in the followers role). This leads to the following
Proposition:
10
Proposition 4 With full market coverage, the game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies, where the Nash
and Stackelberg solutions coincide.
Figure 2. The map of best replies with full market coverage.
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4 Concluding remarks
We have revisited Aokis (2003) analysis of Stackelberg vs Nash equilibria in
a game describing the choice of roles by rms supplying vertically di¤erenti-
11
ated goods and competing in prices. Analysing this issue in the framework
of an extended game with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990) we
have shown that, if partial market coverage prevails, then (i) multiple equi-
libria obtain - all of them involving sequential play - in pure strategies, so
that (ii) the analysis of mixed strategy is informative, as there emerges that
committing mistakes is more likely than playing either pure-strategy equi-
librium. Alternatively, under full coverage, the multiplicity issue completely
vanishes, replaced by unicity of equilibrium at the intersection of dominant
strategies.
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